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Abstract—Attackers can tamper with programs to break usage
conditions. Different software protection techniques have been
proposed to limit the possibility of tampering. Some of them just
limit the possibility to understand the (binary) code, others react
more actively when a change attempt is detected. However, the
validation of the software protection techniques has been always
conducted without taking into consideration a unified process
adopted by attackers to tamper with programs.
In this paper we present an extension of the mini-cycle of
change, initially proposed to model the process of changing
program for maintenance, to describe the process faced by an
attacker to defeat software protections. This paper also shows
how this new model should support a developer when considering
what are the most appropriate protections to deploy.
Index Terms—Program comprehension, Software protection,
Software security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encryption and firewalls are established solutions, largely
adopted to block remote attackers (also know as Man-In-The-
Middle attackers) who try to intercept and tamper with the
communication to steal sensitive data or to break into soft-
ware systems. However, these classic approaches do not help
defending software systems in a context where the attacker is
the end user itself, threat known as Man-At-The-End attack
(MATE) [1]. MATE regards those client applications that are
required to run under strict usage conditions, that could be
violated on tampered clients. For example, client applications
for media conditioned-access (e.g., pay-per-view digital TV)
could be tampered with to access the service in a way that was
not intended by the service provider (e.g., paying a reduced
fee), and on-line game providers should prevent cheating to
ensure a fair competition.
So far, many software protection techniques have been
proposed with the objective of defending code from Man-
At-The-End attacks, some of them are more passive while
others react actively to attacks. Examples of passive protection
techniques are code obfuscation [2] that prevents code com-
prehension by making code more hard to understand while
preserving semantics, and data hiding [3] that aims at hiding
sensitive data (e.g., cryptographic keys) within the program
code. More active protections that react when a modification is
detected are based on tamper-detection with self-checkers [4]
and protections update [5]. Remote attestation [6] is also an
active protection, it is used to detect and react to attacks by
disconnecting tampered clients. Proofs about program integrity
or other interesting properties are generated on the client and
sent a remote verifier. Other techniques, e.g., time bombs
or graceful degradation [7], can be used to make protected
programs unusable if modifications are detected or if programs
are used with no Internet connection for long periods. Program
splitting [8] is another approach to make a tampered program
useless, the original application is split into two parts so that
the sensitive portion is executed in a trusted environment (e.g.,
a remote server). Finally, Code replacement/update [9] is an
option to give the attacker a limited amount of time to succeed
before a new version of the client is released.
Current solutions for software protection are based on the
intuitive (sometimes implicit) assumption that, to be tampered
with, a program needs to be understood and changed. Even
if this intuition is correct, software protections miss a unified
view on the process adopted by attackers to hack around code.
In fact, every protection focuses on a single sub-goal towards
the attack, without paying attention to the overall process and
the collateral activities required to port an attack. For example,
code obfuscation may not be effective in those contexts where
understanding the whole program is not required, but a local
knowledge is sufficient to locate the point of the program to
change (e.g., the routine for license checking).
What is the new idea?With this paper we mean to raise the
awareness of the program understanding community on this
emerging problem, the need to study program understanding
in the context of attacks to software protections. Moreover,
we present the mini-cycle of attack, a preliminary version of a
model intended to describe the process adopted by an attacker
to elaborate an attack against software protection.
Why is this idea new? So far, research in program
understanding was mainly devoted to study the challenges
emerging from development, maintenance and (legitimate)
reverse engineering of programs, while, to the best of our
knowledge, topics related to the understanding of protected
programs for malicious tampering are quite overlooked.
In fact the evaluation of software protections was mainly
conducted by using code metrics [2], [10], [11], [12] or by
measuring how long a tool takes to automatically remove
a specific protection [13]. Theoretical validation could be
done only for a limited class of protections [14]. Empirical
validation involving human participants is a more reliable
measurement, but it is very expensive and it was adopted only
very seldom [15].
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Fig. 1. Mini-cycle of change.
Why is this idea relevant? The immediate benefits of a
unified model of the attack process are many. For instance,
software protections approaches are rarely used alone, often
different approaches are composed in the hope to guarantee a
higher level of protection. However, without a unified vision
on the attack process, the understanding on the interaction of
different protections can be just intuitive, and the composition
might be not effective. As a matter of fact, the trivial strategy
“the more protections, the more secure” fails when a poorly
designed composition is adopted, and a protection leaks the
weak points of the other protection.
Additionally, empirical investigation and user studies [15]
have been conducted to measure and compare the level of
protection offered by distinct approaches. Despite very in-
formative, these studies are very expensive to conduct. A
comprehensive model of what are the challenging tasks faced
by attackers is of fundamental importance to properly design
the most important experiments to conduct. Identifying the
crucial dimensions to investigate with higher priority would
help in reducing the time wasted in experimenting on marginal
aspects. For example, there is a huge number of potential
combination of protection techniques and it would be too
expensive to investigate all of them. A careful planning is
required in order for the research community to be successful.
What is the most relevant paper? This paper builds on
top of the mini-cycle of change, proposed by Rajlich [16]
to describe the process adopted by software developers to
perform maintenance tasks. The mini-cycle of change by
Rajlich is revised and adapted to describe malicious software
tampering, including the challenges faced by an attacker to
defeat potential software protection techniques.
What is the expected feedback from the forum?With this
paper we intend to initiate a discussion on the role of program
understanding for software tampering and on what are the
fundamental differences (and common aspects) with respect to
program understanding for software development. Moreover,
we expect comments, critics and suggestions on the mini-cycle
of attack, on how to extend it and improve it. We also mean
to discuss if the mini cycle of attack represents a valid support
to those programmers who need to design defense strategies
to protect against MATE attacks.
II. BACKGROUND: THE MINI-CYCLE OF CHANGE
The first intuition of the mini-cycle of change was proposed
in 1978 by Yau et al. [17] to model the process adopted by a
programmer to complete a change task. This cycle was based
on the assumption that a change often causes inconsistencies in
the rest of the application code. They are “ripple effects” that
make the application incompatible with the change, so they
need to be taken into account and fixed in an iterative way. This
first intuition was later refined and completed by Rajlic [16].
According to Rajlic, the software change corresponds to the
iterative process summarized in Figure 1. It consists of:
1) Change request: The reason for the code modification
initiates the change process. It may come from cus-
tomers who need a new functionality or from users who
report a defect;
2) Change location: The software is inspected (either
manually or using tools) to acquire the minimal amount
of information required to formulate a hypothesis on
where to apply the change;
3) Change impact analysis: Side effects of the main
change are identified throughout the application code
(the ripple effects) in order to have the complete picture
of the maintenance activity;
4) Change implementation: Once the change task is
known and understood by the developer, the actual
change can be performed;
5) Testing and verification: The changed program is tested
to check whether the implemented corrections satisfy the
initial change request.
If the verification highlights a problem, the mini-cycle is
reiterated. This problem becomes the new change request for
the subsequent iteration. The cycle is iterated until all the
problems are solved and the initial change request can be
considered fully satisfied. Possibly, when the change task is
over, software documentation is updated to record changes.
Differently from those models that consider complete soft-
ware life-cycle (e.g., the waterfall development model), the
mini-cycle is meant to model just modifications. It captures
the process initiated by the developer to respond as fast as
possible to requests for change.
III. THE MINI-CYCLE OF ATTACK
Although software maintenance and malicious software
tampering have fundamental different objectives, we claim that
they share very similar operations. In a software maintenance
scenario, the modification of the software is motivated by a
bug report or by a request for a new feature. While, in case
of attacks, the modification is due to the attacker’s intention
to misuse an application or to “steal” developer’s intellectual
property. However, even with different rationales, both of these
activities involve a cognitive intensive effort to map the change
goal to the code, to consider the side effects of this change
and to evaluate whether the change (or the attack) is successful
or if further actions must be planned. Therefore, our claim is
that maintenance changes and attacks can be described using
a similar model. The mini-cycle of change is a good starting
point to describe attacks to software, but it needs to be adapted
and take into account the specificity of an attack context.
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Fig. 2. Mini-cycle of attack.
The objectives of the attacker are (i) to mount an attack as
fast as possible and (ii) to reduce or avoid the risk of being
detected by software protections. Thus, the original mini-cycle
of change, proposed for software maintenance, needs to be
refined (see Figure 2). It consists of the following phases:
1) Attack goal: This is the final goal of the attacker and
it depends on the asset that the software is supposed to
preserve (e.g., a secret key, a license checking routine);
2) Code understanding: The change location step is re-
named in code understanding, because the attacker is
not necessarily supposed to change the original code.
In fact, depending on the attack goal, a successful
attack may be limited to steal data or code from the
application (e.g., locate a function and use it out of
intended context). While change location (mini-cycle of
change) is performed on known/documented/commented
source code, code understanding (mini-cycle of attack) is
performed on reverse-engineered, probably obfuscated,
code. In any case, this step represents the cognitive
intensive activity, needed to plan the next steps.
3) Impact analysis: Impact analysis is split in two sub
steps to remark that an attacker must also consider active
protections (e.g., anti-tampering or remote attestation):
• Local impact analysis: This step includes the anal-
ysis of those side effects whose consequences are
just local. It is similar to the mini-cycle of change;
• Anticipating detection techniques: Other side ef-
fects could have consequences that are not meaning-
ful at the functional level. However, these changes
could be noticed by local protection techniques
or by a remote entity that may initiate defensive
strategies (e.g., disconnect the tampered client). In
order to defeat protection mechanisms, the attacker
should elaborate a change that is undetectable.
This step is more complex than the corresponding
change impact analysis (mini-cycle of change), because
of incomplete knowledge, e.g., the attackers does not
know what side effects are monitored to reveal tamper-
ing.
4) Attack implementation: The attack is applied as elab-
orated in the previous steps;
5) Verification: Verification is split in two sub-phases:
• Offline testing: Debugging and testing can be used
to verify that the attack is successful with respect to
local resources, i.e., without involving any remote
party;
• Remote connection: In this case, the tampered
application is required to interact with a remote
component, as in the case of on-line games.
The presence of a remote verifier is the main difference
with respect to the mini-cycle of change. In fact, the
remote verifier could black list detected attacks and
prevent the “trial and error” strategy.
Additional iterations might be required if the attack is not
successful after the first one. However, a second attempt might
be impossible, if tampering is detected by a remote verifier.
The mini-cycle of change fits only those cases when new
attacks need to be elaborated. This analysis does not fit
the cases of automatic attacks, e.g., when existing cracks or
patches allow the attacker to reach her/his goal automatically.
IV. ADOPTION OF THE MINI-CYCLE OF ATTACK
The mini-cycle of attack clearly identifies all the phases of
an attack. It represents a valid support for a software developer
when reasoning on which software protections to deploy and
when judging on the trade-off between protection costs (e.g.,
time, memory, performance overhead) and expected benefits.
The effect of software protection techniques can be analyzed
in the light of the mini-cycle of attack. Obfuscation, data hid-
ing, and execution in trusted environment are protections that
operate in the code understanding phase by making the code
more hard to understand. Some variants of obfuscation (e.g.,
control flow flattening) partly protect Local impact analysis.
Remote attestation and anti-tampering protect the anticipate
detective technique phase, because they force the attacker to
elaborate undetectable implementations. Code splitting, and
time bombs also block or limit the offline testing. Execution
in trusted environment and remote attestation are expected to
protect the remote connection phase.
Moreover, the mini-cycle of attack can be used to design
protections with special emphasis on the combination of
elementary techniques. The conception of protections starts
from the identification of the assets to protect.
For instance, let’s assume that the defender needs to protect
the intellectual property of a very efficient implementation
of mathematical functions, because it required a significant
investments of resources and it represents a competitive advan-
tage over the competitors. The adoption of code obfuscation
could protect in the code understanding phase and possibly in
the local impact analysis phase by turning the (binary) code
very hard to understand and to reverse engineer. At this stage,
adding more protections to the same two steps could bring
limited advantages. It might be more appropriate to try and
protect other steps that are relevant to the defender goal, but
still not adequately protected, such as making impossible to do
offline testing. Additionally, the defender should limit the pos-
sibility for the attacker to extract a portion of code and reuse
it in a different context, such as in a product by a competitor.
This could be done by integrating software guards, an active
protection approach where runtime verification of selected
program properties makes the mathematic routine malfunction
(e.g., produce wrong results) when runtime verifications do not
pass. This could be easily achieved by including values coming
from the verification in the mathematical computation, at the
price of a slightly slower performance. If the residual risk
or the performance degradation is not acceptable, the most
sensitive parts of the code could be executed remotely in a
trusted environment. This in turn will also help protecting
from extensive offline testing or trial and error approaches.
The objective of protecting this particular example is to turn
the attack task so expensive that it becomes uneconomical for
the attacker to try and steal the software asset. Probably, an
attacker may give up and devote available resources to the
development of a brand new mathematical library.
The steps to focus on, of course, depend on the attack
that the defender means to prevent. Let’s assume that it is
of critical importance to protect a program against misuse,
for example an on-line game with a considerably large client-
side installation. In this context, the players community is
very important and may decide the success or the failure of
a new game, so cheating should be prevented to preserve the
game reputation. Since this asset is different, the protections
to deploy will be also different. In fact, the most important
attack step to block is probably the verification, in particular in
the remote connection sub-step, to be able to detect tampered
clients and disconnect them from the central game server.
This could be achieved with remote attestation techniques that
should detect tampering. These techniques are meant to make
hard for the attacker to circumvent remote controls during the
anticipate detective techniques phase. Of course, other steps
could be also protected with different protection strategies, but
protecting other parts of the mini-cycle of attack is important
as long as it is of help to discover tampered clients.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND WORK-IN-PROGRESS
In this paper we extended and adapted the mini-cycle of
change, to model the behavior of an attacker who intends to
defeat software protections and tamper with programs. We
proposed the mini-cycle of attack and we showed how it
can be used to support software developers in planning what
protection(s) to deploy and how to compose them.
This preliminary version of mini-cycle of attack needs to
be validated and refined, possibly by conducting a systematic
literature review on how software protection have been vali-
dated and measured (both theoretically and empirically). We
plan to map existing works to a common framework, i.e., the
mini-cycle of attack. This mapping will make it possible to
define a research agenda of the user studies to conduct, to
quantify and compare protection techniques.
Among our future works, we intend to rely on the mini-
cycle of attack to build a decision support system, a tool
to support software developers in identifying the connections
between protections and the assets to protect, and to guide
the evaluation of the trade-off between protection benefits and
protection costs (e.g., performance overhead). Moreover, we
will evaluate if the mini-cycle of attack can be used to perform
risk analysis and assessment, to quantify the security risk.
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